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Abstract

What does it mean to have random numbers? Without understanding where a group of
numbers came from, it is impossible to know if they were randomly generated. However,
common sense claims that if the process to generate these numbers is truly understood,
then the numbers could not be random. Methods that are able to let their internal
workings be known without sacrificing random results are what this paper sets out to
describe. Beginning with a study of what it really means for something to be random, this
paper dives into the topic of random number generators and summarizes the key areas. It
covers the two main groups of generators, true-random and pseudo-random, and gives
practical examples of both. To make the information more applicable, real life examples
of currently used and currently available generators are provided as well. Knowing the
how and why of a number sequence without knowing the values that will come is
possible, and this thesis explains how it is accomplished.
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Random Number Generation: Types and Techniques
A degree of randomness is built into the fabric of reality. It is impossible to say
for certain what a baby’s personality will be, how the temperature will fluctuate next
week, or which way dice will land on their next roll. A planet in which everything could
be predicted would be bland, and much of the excitement of life would be lost. Because
randomness is so inherent in everyday life, many researchers have tried to either harvest
or simulate its effect inside the digital realm. Before accomplishing this feat, however,
many important questions need to be answered. What does it mean to be random? How
does a person go about creating randomness, and how can he capture the randomness he
encounters? How can someone know if an event or number sequence is random or not?
Over generations, the answers to these questions have progressively been developed. This
paper takes a look at the current solutions, and attempts to organize the methods for
creating chaos.
Defining Random
It is impossible to appreciate a random number generator without first
understanding what it means to be random. Developing a well-rounded definition of
randomness can be accomplished by studying a random phenomenon, such as a dice roll,
and exploring what qualities makes it random. To begin, imagine that a family game
includes a die to make things more interesting. In the first turn, the die rolls a five. By
itself, the roll of five is completely random. However, as the game goes on, the sequence
of rolls is five, five, five, and five. The family playing the game will not take long to
realize that the die they received probably is not random. From this illustration, it is
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apparent that when discussing randomness, a sequence of random numbers should be the
focus of the description, as opposed to the individual numbers themselves (Kenny, 2005).
To make sure the next die the family buys is random, they roll it 200 times. This time, the
die did not land on the same face every time, but half of the rolls came up as a one. This
die would not be considered random either, because it has a disproportionate bias toward
a specific number. To be random, the die should land on all possible values equally. In a
third scenario, the dice manufacturer guarantees that now all its dice land on all numbers
equally. Cautious, a family roles this new die 200 times to verify. Although the numbers
were hit uniformly, the family realized that throughout the entire experiment the numbers
always followed a sequence: five, six, one, two, etc. Once again, the randomness of the
die would be questioned. For the die to be accepted as random, it could not have any
obvious patterns in a sequence of dice rolls. If it can be predicted what will happen next,
or anywhere in the future, the die cannot truly be random.
From the results of these dice illustrations a more formal definition of randomness
can be constructed. A generally accepted and basic definition of a random number
sequence is as follows: a random number sequence is uniformly distributed over all
possible values and each number is independent of the numbers generated before it
(Marsaglia, 2005). A random number generator can be defined as any system that creates
random sequences like the one just defined. Unfortunately, time has shown that the
requirements for a random number generator change greatly depending on the context in
which it is used. When a random number generator is used in cryptography, it is vital that
the past sequences can neither be discovered nor repeated; otherwise, attackers would be
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able to break into systems (Kenny, 2005). The opposite is true when a generator is used
in simulations. In this context, it is actually desirable to obtain the same random sequence
multiple times. This allows for experiments that are performed based on changes in
individual values. The new major requirement typical of simulations, especially Monte
Carlo simulations, is that vast amounts of random numbers need to be generated quickly,
since they are consumed quickly (Chan, 2009). For example, in a war simulator a new
random number might be needed every time a soldier fires a weapon to determine if he
hits his target. If a battle consists of hundreds or thousands of soldiers, providing a
random generator quick enough to accommodate it is not trivial. Random numbers are
often used in digital games and in statistical sampling as well. These last two categories
put very few requirements on the random numbers other than that they be actually
random. Inside each of these contexts, requirements even over the additional ones listed
can exist depending on the specific application. There is a general definition describing a
random number generator, but this definition needs to be tailored for each situation a
generator is used in.
Types of Random Number Generators
With a description of randomness in hand, focus can shift to random number
generators themselves and how they are constructed. Typically, whenever a random
number generator is being discussed, its output is given in binary. Generators exist that
have non-binary outputs, but whatever is produced can be converted into binary after the
fact. There are two main types of random number generators. The first type attempts to
capture random events in the real world to create its sequences. It is referred to as a true
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random number generator, because in normal circumstances it is impossible for anyone to
predict the next number in the sequence. The second camp believes that algorithms with
unpredictable outputs (assuming no one knows the initial conditions) are sufficient to
meet the requirements for randomness. The generators produced through algorithmic
techniques are called pseudo-random generators, because in reality each value is
determined based off the system’s state, and is not truly random. To gain an
understanding of how these generators work, specific examples from both categories will
be examined.
True Random Number Generators
A true random number generator uses entropy sources that already exist instead of
inventing them. Entropy refers to the amount of uncertainty about an outcome. Real word
events such as coin flips have a high degree of entropy, because it is almost impossible to
accurately predict what the end result will be. It is the source of entropy that makes a true
random number generator unpredictable. Flipping coins and rolling dice are two ways
entropy could be obtained for a generator, although the rate at which random numbers
could be produced would be restricted. Low production rate is a problem that plagues
most true random number generators (Foley, 2001). Another major disadvantage of these
generators is that they rely on some sort of hardware. Since they use real world
phenomena, some physical device capable of recording the event is needed. This can
make true random generators a lot more expensive to implement, especially if the
necessary device is not commonly used. It also means that the generators are vulnerable
to physical attacks that can bias the number sequences. Finally, even when there are no
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attackers present, physical devices are typically vulnerable to wear over time and errors
in their construction that can naturally bias the sequences produced (Sunar, Martin, &
Stinson, 2006). To overcome bias, most true random number generators have some sort
of post processing algorithm that can compensate for it. Despite these disadvantages,
there are many contexts where having number sequences that are neither artificially made
nor reproducible is important enough to accept the obstacles. For security experts, there is
a peace of mind that comes with knowing that no mathematician can break a code that
does not exist. In the next sections, four major true random generators: Random.org,
Hotbits, lasers, and oscillators will be covered.
Random.org. A widely used true random number generator is hosted on a
website named Random.org. Random.org freely distributes the random sequences it
generates, leading to a varied user base (Haahr, 2011). Applications of these numbers
have ranged everywhere from an online backgammon server to a company that uses the
numbers for random drug screenings (Kenny, 2005). However, since the numbers are
obtained over the Internet, it would be unwise to use them for security purposes or
situations where the sequence absolutely needs to stay private. There is always the risk
that the transmission will be intercepted. The random number generator from this site
collects its entropy from atmospheric noise. Radio devices pick up on the noise and run it
through a postprocessor that converts it into a stream of binary ones and zeroes. Scholars
have pointed out that the laws governing atmospheric noise are actually deterministic, so
the sequences produced by this generator are not completely random (Random.org,
2012). The proponents of this claim believe that only quantum phenomena are truly
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nondeterministic. Random.org has countered this argument by pointing out that the
number of variables that would be required to predict the values of atmospheric noise are
infeasible for humans to obtain. Guessing the next number produced would mean
accurately recoding every broadcasting device and atmospheric fluctuation in the area,
possibly even down to molecules. It has been certified by several third parties that the
number sequences on this site pass the industry-standard test suites, making it a free and
viable option for casual consumers of random numbers.
HotBits. The other popular free Internet-based random number generator is
referred to as HotBits. This site generates its random number sequences based off of
radioactive decay. Because this is a quantum-level phenomenon, there is no debate over
whether the number sequences are truly non-deterministic. At the same time, the process
involved in harvesting this phenomenon restricts HotBits to only producing numbers at
the rate of 800 bits (100 bytes) per second (HotBits, 2012). Although the HotBits server
stores a backlog of random numbers, the rate at which random sequences can be
extracted is still limited in comparison to other options. As with Random.org, random
numbers obtained from this generator are sent over the Internet, so there is always the
possibility that a third party has knowledge of the sequence. This makes it unsuitable for
security-focused applications, but Hotbits is useful when unquestionably random data is
necessary.
Lasers. The use of lasers allows for true random number generators that
overcome the obstacle of slow production. In laser-based generators, entropy can be
obtained by several different means. Having two photons race to a destination is one
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method that is currently implemented (Stefanov, et al., 2008). Another high-speed
technique is measuring the varying intensity of a chaotic laser. Prototype systems in this
second category have been created that can produce random bits at rates of over ten
Gigabits per second (Li, Wang, & Zhang, 2010). The prototypes exhibited a natural bias
toward one value over the other, so a post processor needed to be applied to create truly
random sequences. A commonly used tactic is to take several bits at a time and exclusiveor them together to remove the unwanted bias. The stream of bits that emerged from this
process was able to pass the most stringent randomness tests that are used for generators
dealing with cryptography. Laser generators are capable of increased speeds, but they are
complex to install and prohibitively expensive. Care needs to be taken during
construction and installation that no bias is introduced, and the natural wear of the laser
could also lead to it subtly producing more biased results over time. It is difficult to
imagine laser-based generators being used in practical applications.
Oscillators. Oscillators, the final category of true random number generator to be
discussed, make use of basic hardware, resulting in more convenient installation. An
oscillator is a simple circuit obtained by placing an odd number of inverter gates in a
loop. The final output of this configuration is undefined, since the current oscillates in a
sine wave pattern over time. However, manufacturing is never perfect and defects always
cause a slight and random deviation from a sine wave. These deviations are referred to as
jitter, which is a common source of entropy in simple random number generators (Sunar,
Martin, & Stinson, 2006). Because oscillators rely on manufacturing defects that cannot
be replicated, they are part of a broader group of physical unclonable functions, or PUF
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(Gassend, Clarke, Dijk, & Devadas, 2002). PUF are simple hardware that rely on
unrepeatable idiosyncrasies during production to create random patterns. There are many
types of PUF; oscillators are part of the delay category since jitter is caused by delay
introduced by differences in the wires and silicon. To increase the randomness of jitter,
oscillators of different lengths can be combined and evaluated together. Oscillators are
cheap to install and use in comparison to other types of physical devices since their
components are commonly used.
Random number generators based off of oscillators are vulnerable to many types
of attacks. Environmental effects such as temperature changes and power surges can
influence the jitter of a system. Attackers can change these variables intentionally to
influence the random sequence for a limited time. These techniques are known as noninvasive attacks because they don’t require direct contact to initiate. Invasive attacks can
also be launched against oscillators. These attacks attempt to inflict a permanent defect
inside the oscillator system, which will break the circuit and force a nonrandom output
(Sunar, Martin, & Stinson, 2006). Fortunately, complexity can be added into oscillatorbased generators that can thwart both types of attacks. When compared to pseudo-random
generators that use tamper-proof algorithms, true random generators can appear to be
very fragile. The actual case is a tradeoff between passive and active attacks. A passive
attack occurs when the attacker does not need to alter the system, and is much harder to
detect then active attacks, which often leave a footprint. Although true random number
generators can suffer from active attacks, the pseudo-random generators that will be
described are all vulnerable to passive attacks where the entire sequence past and future
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can be predicted. In high-risk situations like cryptography, the potential setbacks of true
generators are often preferable.
Pseudo Random Number Generators
Random number generators that do not rely on real world phenomena to produce
their streams are referred to as pseudo random number generators. These generators
appear to produce random sequences to anyone who does not know the secret initial
value. In a minimalistic generator, the initial value will be the only time entropy is
introduced into the system. Unlike true random number generators that convert entropy
sources directly into sequences, a pseudo random needs to find entropy to use to keep
itself unpredictable. Classic tactics for accomplishing this include taking the time of day,
the location of the mouse, or the activity on the keyboard. Another way of explaining
these sources is that they use the entropy of human interaction. This approach is frowned
on in secure settings, because an attacker could purposely manipulate physical
interactions to bias the system (Gutternman, Pinkas, & Reinman, 2006). If no human
users interface with the hardware, generators are normally able to use other components
on the system, such as hard drives, to generate entropy. Regardless, pseudo random
number generators are limited by the entropy in their host device. These entropy sources
all but determine the quality of the resulting sequences.
If the initial values of a pseudo random generator are known, every value in the
sequence can be easily determined and even recalculated. This makes securing pseudo
random generators against attackers of pivotal importance. The generator should be
designed so that determining the internal variables at any given time is an infeasible task.

RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION

13

Going further, assuming that an attacker is able to determine the internal variables at a
point in time, pseudo random generators should still be able to protect themselves.
Forward security is the term used to describe a generator where knowing the internal state
of a generator at a point in time will not help an attacker learn about previous outputs
(Gutternman, Pinkas, & Reinman, 2006). If random number generators are being used for
purposes like password creation, keeping up forward security becomes vital. Backward
security denotes that an attacker who learns the state of the generator at a point in time
will not be able to determine future numbers that will be produced. Backward security is
only possible if the generator introduces some level of entropy into its equation. True
random number generators always have forward and backward security, because they
have no deterministic components.
Outside attackers are not the only problem inherent in pseudo random generators.
At times honest or malicious mistakes can render an entire generator insecure. For
example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST, periodically
publishes a list of pseudo random generators it deems secure enough for cryptography. In
their 2007 publication, one of the four generators listed was championed by the National
Security Agency, or NSA. It was called Dual_EC_DRBG (Schneier, 2007). Independent
researchers quickly discovered that this generator contained a backdoor. Theoretically,
there exists a set of constant numbers that, when known, would allow an attacker to
predict every value of NSA’s generator after collecting thirty-two bytes of random
output. Although it is impossible to tell if the NSA possessed that set of constants, or
even knew that such a thing existed, this served as a reminder that all pseudo random
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generators should be thoroughly examined by experts before they are trusted. Since
random numbers are used in many important applications such as setting up secure
Internet communications, there are many groups that desire to crack the generators
involved. Pseudo random number generators generally lack entropy after initialization, so
once they are broken the attacker requires no additional effort to monitor the system.
Additional complexity and thorough security checks need to be included in all pseudo
random number generators to make them safe for public use.
Aside from vulnerability to attacks, all pseudo random generators share
fundamental limitations. Without continual entropy, random generators can only create
sequences based off of a limited set of initial conditions. Sequences created this way can
only last a limited amount of time before they reach their starting point and repeat
themselves exactly. The length a sequence can extend before it repeats itself is referred to
as its period (Chan, 2009). A major consideration in the choice of a pseudo random
number generator is the size of its period, because this directly affects the frequency that
a generator can be used. Pseudo random generators are capable of producing sequences at
rapid speeds, so in applications that use vast quantities of randomness, the threat of
exceeding the period is not trivial. The field of cryptography also contributes to the
creation of pseudo random numbers. Good encryption techniques that make messages
undecipherable can also be used to encrypt a starting value into seemingly random
numbers. Most encryption techniques have a poor production rate however, so using
encryption techniques in generators is generally a bad idea (Trappe & Washington,
2006). In the next sections, several of the more common algorithms used in random
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number generation, namely linear congruential, lagged fibonacci, and feedback shift
registers, will be discussed.
Linear congruential generator. A simple example of a pseudo random number
generator is the linear congruential generator. The formula for the algorithm it uses is:
si+1 = (a* si + c) mod m (Chan, 2009). This algorithm requires an initial value for so,
and chosen constants a, c, and m. If the constants are selected in accordance with the
well-established rules publicly available, such as choosing an m value that is prime, then
this algorithm will produce every value zero through m exactly once in its period, which
is m, and is uniformly distributed. This algorithm demonstrates the point that pseudo
random generators are deterministic. The entropy for this generator is the initial so value,
since a, c, and m will most likely remain constant between uses. Once so is selected, the
entire resulting sequence is solidified even before it is calculated. Although the sequence
is unpredictable initially, once a seed value for the system is reused or an attacker
recognizes the number sequence, then subsequent values can be predicted. The Boost
library, a popular programming package, includes an implementation of a linear
congruential generator (Chan, 2009).
Lagged Fibonacci generator. A major problem with simple linear algorithms is
that the period is limited by m. With the lagged Fibonacci algorithm, much larger periods
can be obtained. The basic form of this algorithm is si+1 = si−p ± si−q mod m (Chan,
2009). This algorithm can be used in conjunction with addition, subtraction,
multiplication, or even exclusive-or (XOR). Because multiple past values are used
instead of just the previous value as in the linear algorithms, values can be repeated inside
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the period without indicating a loop. In the Boost library implementation of this
algorithm, p is set to 44497, q is 21034, and the resulting period is around 22300000 (Chan,
2009). A period of this size greatly reduces the likelihood of pattern recognition and
secures the generator from the more basic forms of passive attacks.
Feedback shift registers. At times, it can be easier to describe pseudo random
number generators in terms of hardware instead of their mathematical form. This is the
case with feedback shift registers. These are best visualized as a string of n bits sitting
inside a register in hardware. An even number of positions are selected: such as indexes
five, seven, nine, and n. These generators operate by performing XOR on the bits at these
positions, taking the result as the new leftmost bit, and shifting the rest of the string right
by one (Dichtl, 2003). The bit that gets shifted out is the next random bit in the generators
output. Mathematically, this algorithm can be written as xp = xp−t1 +· · ·+xp−tn +x0,
where x is the bit string of length n, and t decides the index positions (Sunar, Martin, &
Stinson, 2006). An advantage of these types of generators is that entropy can be easily
added into the system, simply by including the new information into the XOR operation.
Without entropy being introduced, shift registers have a period of 2n – 1, because zero
will never be the result.
The Mersenne Twister is a very popular and widely used example of feedback
shift registers in simulation and modeling (Nishimura, 2000). It is a good first choice
when picking a pseudo random number generator. The Mersenne Twister can be
classified as a twisted generalized feedback shift register (TGFSR), which has algorithms
more tightly tied to matrices than strings. Adaptations exist both for making the generator
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faster and making it secure enough for cryptography. The benefits of this generator are
rapid number generation, highly random sequences, and a large period. Because this
generator is so popular, implementations and source code examples are easily available.
Case Study: Linux Random Number Generator
This sub-section examines a concrete example of a widely used random number
generator, specifically, the one used in the Linux operating system. Linux allows users to
utilize its internal random numbers, and uses them itself for functions such as generating
SSL keys, TCP sequence numbers, and random identifiers (Gutternman, Pinkas, &
Reinman, 2006). The Linux pseudo random generator consists of three stores of random
bits. The first store serves as the primary source of entropy. It uses signals sent from
peripherals as its source of randomness. Whenever there is a keystroke, mouse
movement, or interrupt, a 32 bit message is sent containing a timestamp and the details of
the event that occurred. Each store keeps track of the number of entropy bits it currently
contains. Whenever a store of bits needs to be used, its entropy counter is decremented by
the amount of bits read, the extracted bits are encrypted with SHA-1 encryption, and new
bits are added to the store that are derived from the bits it currently possess. New bits are
added using a twisted generalized feedback shift register, similar to the Mersenne
Twister. During each round, entropy is added to the string by inserting new random bits
at a random location inside the register. Both the entropy bits to add and the position to
insert them are determined by captured hardware events. The two remaining stores of bits
are actually used by calls to the system’s random functions. The first of these stores is for
insecure random numbers, referenced by the /dev/urandom command (Gutternman,
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Pinkas, & Reinman, 2006). This command will provide users with a specified amount of
random bits. If there is not enough entropy in the urandom store to produce the bits, it
will attempt to draw from the primary store of bits. In the event that there is still not
enough entropy in the system, the urandom store will simply use the feedback shift
register to produce pseudo-random bits to fill the gap. The third store of bits, which is
used for the /dev/random command, is intended for high entropy sequences. In the event
that this pool cannot find enough entropy for a request, it will block the operation until it
can. Users receive random bits in groups of 32, a unit known as a word.
Many programmers have contributed to the Linux random number generator, but
since it is only pseudo random, attacks have been found that can be used against it. The
Linux generator lacks forward security. If the state of any of the stores is known at a
point of time, all the previous outputs of that store can be computed back to the last time
entropy was added (Gutternman, Pinkas, & Reinman, 2006). This stems from the fact that
each store remains virtually the same between extractions, the only change being 96 bits
around the random index j. To brute force the last random bit, an attacker would need to
take the 296 possible previous states of the store and see which one results in the current
state after an extraction. The previous random bit is determined when the previous state is
found, because it is a by-product of the transitional algorithm. Once the previous state is
known, it is again possible to determine the 32 bits produced two calls ago. The only end
to this cycle comes when the store is refreshed with random data, which leaves no
deterministic algorithm that can crack it. In the world of computer security, any algorithm
with more than 280 possibilities is considered secure. With current technology, the time it
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would take to try 280 or more options is infeasible no matter how vital the data. Fourteen
of the possible indexes, namely 18-31, are special in that they affect less of the pool than
normal however. If it happens that the index j is one of these, then the complexity of
determining the previous output falls down to 264, which is considered insecure for
security purposes. At the same time, it is a relatively complex attack to use for only 32
bits of data, so the threat is not overwhelming.
Aside from the mathematical approach, there are side-channel attacks that can be
used against the Linux random number generator. Unless the particular distribution of the
operating system changes the setting, there is no limit to the amount of data that can be
requested from the urandom command. An attacker can exploit this and request an
infinite amount of data. The result is that all of the entropy in the primary and the
urandom stores will be constantly depleted. Calls to random will be denied indefinitely as
a result, and other users of urandom will get deterministic output, which can be figured
by the previously described attack. Most likely, a monitored Linux system would be safe
from this attack because the call for that much random data would set off red flags for
administrators. A more far-fetched attack has also been described (Gutternman, Pinkas, &
Reinman, 2006). If the Linux operating system is booted from a CD to a computer
without a hard drive, then the only initial source of entropy will be keyboard events. Most
often, the first thing entered into the keyboard is a user’s password. Therefore, the
entropy introduced to the pool would be exclusively generated by the user’s password,
and an attack on the store could theoretically extract it. The researchers who proposed the
attack were not able to successfully complete it, although the machine they experimented
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with had a hard drive (Gutternman, Pinkas, & Reinman, 2006). Because Linux uses a
pseudo random generator, more attacks than the ones discussed likely exist. It is this
threat of outsiders calculating secret random numbers that make the system less than truly
random.
Case Study: RSA Key Generation
Encryption means nothing at all if the random number generators it relies on are
poorly constructed. This fact became relevant on a global scale when a standard for
encryption named RSA was shown to be predictable in some cases. RSA is a public-key
algorithm that uses secret prime values to compute a modulus n. This n value used in
both the encryption and decryption of messages, and security relies on its prime factors
remaining secret. The range of possible prime numbers is large enough that they should
never be reused or guessed. However, researchers found that they were able to remotely
break the encryption on .4% of all the RSA signed certificates in their study, which
included 5.8 million samples (Lenstra, et al., 2012). To break the encryption, researchers
simply needed to use the Euclidean algorithm on all the samples to see if any of them
shared a common factor in the modulus. If they did, then both of the RSA certificates
could be broken, because the prime numbers were discovered. After studying the problem
with RSA, the researchers found that its root was in the random number generators being
used for these certificates. The repeated primes were mostly isolated to cases where the
RSA certificate was created by an embedded device, such as a firewall, router, or printer.
These devices typically do not have enough entropy to create unpredictable prime
numbers. Also, devices from the same manufacturer likely have the same starting
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condition for their generators, meaning that the first random numbers produced will be
similar. Therefore, when these devices were used to create random prime numbers a
couple primes were frequently repeated. That allowed the attackers to do their pair-wise
comparison of certificates and break the resulting encryptions. This phenomenon
reinforced the fact that strong random number generators form the backbone of modern
cryptography.
Testing a Random Number Generator
Many sequences that appear random may actually be easy to predict. For this
reason, it is important to thoroughly test any generator that claims to produce random
results. A fitting description of random in this context is as follows: a random sequence is
one that cannot be described by a sequence shorter than itself (L’Ecuyer, 2007).
Attempting to find these patterns by intuition would be difficult if not impossible.
Fortunately, many tests exist that can suggest if numbers in a sequence are random, and
the algorithms in these tests are widely used outside of random numbers. Whenever
professional forecasters make data-driven predictions, they apply formulas to determine
the probability that the results were not random. These formulas can likewise be used to
verify that a result was random, and the only thing that must change is the passing
criteria. No test can conclusively prove randomness; the best that can be accomplished is
that with enough testing, users of the generators can be confident that the sequence is
random enough. There are scholars who believe that the source of a random sequence
should dictate what tests to run. For example, true random generators tend to exhibit bias
toward values, and this trait worsens as the hardware wears down. As a result, these
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scholars claim that if a random sequence comes from a true random generator, extra tests
should be performed that check for bias (Kenny, 2005). Other scholars believe that
random is random regardless of where it came from, and that it is appropriate to test all
random sequences the same. In the following subsections several statistical and
exploratory tests will be examined, as well as the major test suites NIST and Diehard.
Statistical Tests
One of the approaches to testing random number generators is leveraging the wide
array of statistical formulas. With this approach, each test examines a different quality
that a random number generator should have. For example, a random generator would go
through a chi-squared test to ensure a uniform distribution, and then a reversearrangements test to see if the sequences contained any trends. Confidence in the
generator’s randomness is only gained after it passes an entire suite of tests which comes
at it from different directions. These tests should be run on more than just a single
sequence to ensure that the test results are accurate. Making the act of testing more
difficult is the fact that failing a test does not indicate that a generator is not random.
When outputs are truly random, then there will be some isolated sequences produced that
appear non-random (Haahr, 2011). Tests need to be picked carefully and tailored to the
context generators are needed in. The chi-squared, runs, next bit, and matrix based tests
will be examined because of their popularity.
Chi-squared test. The chi-squared test is used to ensure that available numbers
are uniformly utilized in a sequence. This test is easy to understand and set up, so it is
commonly used (Foley, 2001). The formula for the test is: x = ∑ (Oi – Ei)2 / Ei, where
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the summation is over all the available categories. O represents the actual number of
entries in the category, and E is the expected number of entries. For example, if the
random numbers were scattered one through six, then there would be six categories, and
the number of times each value appeared in the sequence would become the values of O.
When the resulting value is above the chosen significance level, then it can be said that
the values in the sequence are uniformly distributed. Because this test is simple, it can be
run many times on different sequences with relative ease to increase the chance of its
accuracy (Foley, 2001).
The runs test. An important trait for a random sequence is that it does not contain
patterns. The test of runs above and below the median can be used to verify this property
(Foley, 2001). In this test, the number of runs, or streaks of numbers, above or below the
median value are counted. If the random sequence has an upward or downward trend, or
some kind of cyclical pattern, the test of runs will pick up on it. The total number of runs
and the number of values above and below the median are recorded from the sequence.
Then, these values are used to compute a z-score to determine if numbers are appearing
in a random order. The formula for the score is: z = ( (u ± 0.5) – MEANu ) / σu, where σ
denotes the standard deviation of the sequence. (Foley, 2001). Just like the chi-squared
test, a test for runs is easy to implement, and can be run frequently.
Next bit test. When testing pseudo random generators for cryptography
applications, the next bit test is a staple. In its theoretical form, the next bit test declares
that a generator is not random if given every number in the generated sequence up to that
point there is an algorithm that can predict the next bit produced with significantly greater
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than 50% accuracy (Lavasani & Eghlidos, 2009). This definition makes the next bit test
virtually impossible to implement, because it would require trying every conceivable
algorithm to predict the next bit. Instead, it can be used after a pattern is discovered to
cement the fact that a generator is insecure. Several attempts have been made to alter the
next bit test so that it can be used as an actual test. The universal next bit test developed
in 1996 was the first to allow the next bit test to be administered, but it was shown that
this test would pass non-random generators. Later, the practical next bit test was
developed and was shown to be as accurate as the NIST test suite at the time, if not more
so (Lavasani & Eghlidos, 2009). However, this test required a large amount of resources
to run, limiting its usefulness. The next bit test remains relevant in cryptography because
it has been proven that if a generator can pass the theoretical next bit test, then it will pass
every other statistical test for randomness.
Matrix-based tests. Although the previous statistical test looks at the sequence of
numbers linearly, a large portion of the more advanced testing techniques view it in terms
of vectors and matrices. These tests will take the values of the generator, and sequentially
add them into a hypercube, which is a cube with k dimensions (L’Ecuyer, 2007). From
here the tests vary, although many of them conclude with a chi-squared calculation on
their output (Chan, 2009). In a nearest pair test, Euclidean distances are computed and the
nearest pairs are used to look for time-lagged patterns. It has been proposed that a large
number of pseudo random generators based on circuits will fail the nearest pairs test, and
it is one of the more stringent tests available. Multidimensional tests are often specifically
tailored to look at random number generators, unlike the linear tests which are
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multipurpose. The calculations in matrix-based tests are complex, and will not be
presented in this thesis.
Exploratory Analysis
Although it is true that determining randomness by intuition is a poor choice,
visualizing random sequences is a good preliminary method to understand the data. There
are several ways that sequences can be plotted in an attempt to bring out any oddities
inside the random generator. Figure 1 is a bitmap obtained from the rand() function in
PHP on Windows (Haahr, 2011). By turning the sequence into a plot, it becomes more
apparent that the given generator has some patterns in its sequences. In an ideal
generator, the bitmap would seem like complete static, but in this example sections of
black and white are clearly grouped. From this point, more specific tests can be decided
on to determine just how severe the patterns actually are.
There is overlap between the problems that graphs can bring out and the problems
that statistical techniques look for. A run sequence plot is designed to look for trends in a
sequence, much like the test for runs. To create this plot, actual sequence values on the yaxis are compared against the values’ indexes in the sequence (Foley, 2001). If there are
trends in the sequence, this plot will make them easier to see. A histogram plot has a
comparable purpose to the chi-squared test. It is composed of a bar graph, with the
different categories on the x-axis plotted against the number of times that value appears
on the y-axis. Any kind of non-uniformity will be brought out quickly this way, signaling
that more tests concerning uniform distribution should be run.
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Other exploratory graphs exist that
look for unique types of problems. A lag
plot graphs a value on the y-axis against the
value that came before it on the x-axis
(Foley, 2001). The purpose of this plot is to
expose outliers in the data. If the lag plot has
too many outliers, there is most likely a
problem with the generator. Another unique

Figure 1. Obtained from Random.org

exploratory tool is the autocorrelation plot. An autocorrelation plot examines the
correlation of a value to the values that came before it at various intervals, called lags. If
the plot displays no correlations between values at any lag, then the numbers are most
likely independent of each other, which is a good indication of randomness. Using these
exploratory plots allows analysts to get a feeling for the faults of a generator and better
decide on which tests to run on the number sequences.
NIST
Of the available suites for testing random number generators, the NIST suite
reigns as the industry standard (Kenny, 2005). The NIST suite was designed to test bit
sequences, with the idea that passing all NIST tests means that a generator is fit for
cryptographic purposes. Even new true random number generators have their preliminary
results run through the NIST battery to demonstrate their potential (Li, Wang, & Zhang,
2010). The NIST suite contains fifteen well-documented statistical tests (NIST.gov,
2008). Because cryptography has the most stringent requirements for randomness out of
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all the categories, a generator that passes the NIST suite is also random enough for all
other applications. However when a generator fails the NIST suite, it could still be
random enough to serve in areas such as gaming and simulation, since the consequences
of using less than perfectly random information is small. NIST does not look at factors
such as rate of production, so passing the NIST suite should not be the only factor when
determining a generator’s quality.
Diehard
Another widely used suite of random number tests is known as Diehard. This
suite was invented by George Marsaglia in 1995 (Kenny, 2005). It was made to be an
update for the original random number test suite, Knuth. Knuth is named after Donald
Knuth and was published in the 1969 book The Art of Computer Programming, Volume
2. Knuth’s tests were designed before cryptography became a major industry, and the
suite was later considered to be too easy to pass for situations where vast quantities of
random numbers were needed. Diehard was designed to be more difficult to pass than
Knuth’s suite, fulfilling the role of a general-purpose battery for detecting nonrandomness. All of the tests are available free online, so they can be easily used to test
any number sequence (Marsaglia, 2005). The Diehard suite has not been updated since its
inception in 1995, but is still a widely used test suite (Kenny, 2005).
Conclusion
Many techniques are used to create the various types of random number
generators. Although the idea of constructing a system that produces randomness can
seem like a contradiction, decades of research has refined the art. On one end of the
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spectrum, random number generators can serve as a funnel; they take random events from
the real world as input and convert them into sequences of random numbers. Classically,
these truly random number generators have been labeled as slow and difficult to install.
However, the advent of laser-based generators is helping to solve the speed problem,
while circuit-based generators are being designed that utilize existing hardware. True
random number generators can be delicate though. Because they are constantly collecting
feedback from outside phenomenon, care needs to be taken so attackers do not disrupt
their environment.
On the other end of the spectrum, mathematicians and cryptographers have
developed many algorithms that are unpredictable under certain circumstances. The predetermined yet unforeseen sequences that result from these methods have been labeled
pseudo random. Easily set up and able to produce values quickly, pseudo random
generators are most commonly used. Normally, these generators need to keep their initial
conditions and parameters a secret, or else anyone could compute the same number
sequence. Even assuming that the initial conditions are not disclosed, pseudo random
generators need to be designed in a way that recording part of the sequence or
discovering the state of the generator does not allow new information to be computed.
Unless these pseudo random generators have some method of refreshing themselves with
real world entropy, they will eventually repeat themselves. If the designer of the random
algorithm has malicious intent, it is possible for a backdoor to be installed that would
allow outsiders to start predicting the numbers. Fortunately, all of these concerns about
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security do not affect many applications that need random generators. Most times, a graband-go pseudo random generator can meet the needs of an application.
The method for selecting and appraising the most appropriate random number
generator is highly dependent on context. If a high security application needs random
numbers, then running a candidate generator through the NIST test suite would be
appropriate. Preferably, this would be accompanied by researching the known attacks that
can be launched against it. Perfect randomness and security is not the final say in
selection however. When picking a generator for a simulation, quantity could win out
over quality. Having the best randomness is not always relevant. In these cases,
exploratory plots of the random generator could be used to determine what tests inside a
suite such as Diehard should be run. Known vulnerabilities might be ignored entirely.
Gaming takes a middle ground, because the random sequences only need to be good
enough to keep players from predicting them. How hard the potential players are going to
try is the baseline for how much testing and security analysis needs to be done. The
growing demand for digital unpredictability has led the field of random number
generation to grow rapidly in breadth and complexity. Fortunately, the types and
techniques at the core of random number generators have remained stable for decades.
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